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Empirical studies in international macroeconomics and trade present a rich and seemingly
disparate array of stylized facts regarding rm pricing behavior when selling for domestic
and export sale. In particular, rms often price to market and do not fully pass changes in
marginal costs and exchange rates through to foreign buyers. An impressive list of empirical
studies in international trade1 also demonstrates that trade liberalization is associated with
rms charging lower markups over marginal costs when setting prices. Among other con-
tributions, Atkeson and Burstein (2007) show that numerical simulation of a model based
on price competition developed by Bernard, Eaton, Jensen, and Kortum (2003) (BEJK) can
capture these three stylized facts. We derive explicit formulas for the distribution of markups
to show why and when this is the case.
In addition, recent macroeconomic studies report longer lags in adjusting prices for export
markets than when selling to domestic buyers, price changes that are more highly synchro-
nized for domestic sales than for export sales, and higher rates of passthrough among rms
that change their prices more frequently.2 A small but burgeoning set of trade studies demon-
strates that in contrast to trade in goods, foreign direct investment (FDI) generates higher
markups or prot margins in target rms following foreign takeovers and greeneld FDI.
We build on insights from the numerical simulations of Atkeson and Burstein (2007 and
2008), Garetto (2009), and de Blas and Russ (2010) to present a generalized version of
Bernard, Eaton, Jensen, and Kortum (2003) with free entry that can capture all of these
stylized facts. With free entry, we explicitly introduce \teams of rivals" within the BEJK
framework that generate the observed markup and pricing behavior.3 We are able to present
tractable analytical solutions for the distribution of markups under autarky, trade, and FDI
when the number of rms competing to supply the market is not xed or ltered out. In
short, we use free entry to build a standard Ricardian model of trade with a well specied
distribution of markups that is consistent with observed domestic, export, and multinational
pricing behavior.
1Among these are Levinsohn (1993), Harrison (1994), Roberts and Supina (1996), Bottasso and Sembenelli
(2001), Novy (2010), and Feenstra and Weinstein (2010).
2For instance, see Schoenle (2010), Haller and Fitzgerald (2010), and Gopinath and Itshokhi (2010).
3We take the term \team of rivals" to indicate a decision process governed by intense competition within
a group from the bestseller Team of Rivals by Doris Kearns Goodwin (2006). Goodwin tells how in 1861, the
newly elected President Abraham Lincoln installed all of his rivals for the Republican presidential nomination
(as well as two Democrats) in his cabinet, producing policy amalgamated within a crucible of dissent rather
than through harmonious coordination between like-minded individuals.
1Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas 
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the context of trade by BEJK. They use the Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) love of variety to
limit the market shares of heterogeneous rms. Only one rm ends up supplying each good,
similar to the Dixit-Stiglitz model of monopolistic competition. However, the supply side of
the market for each good in the continuum is characterized by a erce competition among a
group of rival rms competing to be the sole producer. The most ecient rm in this group
ultimately becomes the sole supplier of that particular good, but only because it beats back
its competitors by underselling them: it can not charge a price higher than the marginal cost
of its next best rival. The low-cost supplier can not automatically charge the Dixit-Stiglitz
markup despite the constant elasticity of substitution (CES) overlaying the demand for their
goods. Rather, if the competition is suciently strong, the best rm must charge a price
equal to the marginal cost of its next best rival. The CES markup becomes the maximum
markup that it might charge over its own marginal cost without jeopardizing prots; it is no
longer the default markup.
The challenge is to t this competitive eect into a tractable framework which also cap-
tures observed reductions in markups under trade, as the distribution of markups does not
change with trade liberalization in the BEJK model. To do this, we generalize the BEJK
setting to allow for an endogenous number of rival competitors in each industry. This entry
does not aect the number of goods produced, but rather the number of rms competing to
be the low-cost supplier of a particular good. \Competing" in this sense means drawing an
eciency parameter from an identical distribution and being ready to jump into production
if a chance arises to undersell an active rm. The most ecient rm will have the lowest
cost| the rst order statistic for costs in the industry| and become the only active sup-
plier. An increase in the number of rms that compete to be the low-cost supplier of a good
changes the shape of the entire distribution of marginal costs and lowers the expected value
of the rst order statistic for marginal costs. It also shifts the mass in the distribution of
markups toward the lower end. Therefore, increased entry reduces the aggregate price level
under autarky.
Openness to trade has a rst-order eect that is similar to increasing domestic entry
under autarky. Higher geographic frictions impede trade as in BEJK, but also increase
suppliers' market power, allowing them to charge higher markups conditional on the trade
cost. Trade can also increase eciency directly by encouraging more entry. In our order-
statistic framework, increasing entry changes the entire shape of the distribution of eciency
levels among active rms, moving the mass toward the upper end of the distribution and
depressing markups even further. Both because the distribution of markups is itself a function
of trade costs and because the number of rivals alters the entire distribution of eciency levels
2and markups, the model includes gains from trade not subject to the critique in Arkolakis,
Costinot, and Rodriguez-Clare (2010).
By introducing dierent shocks into the model, we are also able to explain stylized facts
with regard to the frequency of price changes in domestic versus export sales. We can quantify
the degree of price rigidity conditional on the intensity of competition. Firms with greater
market power at the point of sale are able to adjust their prices more frequently in response
to idiosyncratic cost shocks because their price is not bounded as strongly by their next-best
rival. Industries where sectoral shocks are more prevalent than idiosyncratic shocks also will
experience more frequent price changes, as shocks that aect the eciency of all rivals do
not aect markups. In the empirical literature, the connection between the frequency of
price changes and market concentration is generally positive not robust. In our model, this
lack of robustness would arise if sectoral shocks were less prevalent than idiosyncratic shocks
in industries with greater market concentration (a lower number of rivals to produce each
good).4
Cross-border takeovers increase markups and reduce prices in the host country, but
foreign-owned rms charge higher markups than domestic rms. When a cross-border takeover
transfers superior foreign technology to a local target rm, the target becomes even more
ecient than its next best local competitor, increasing the markup. At the same time, the
marginal cost of the next best local rival has not changed, so the acquired rm can not
increase its price and may even end up cutting it, passing on some of its technological e-
ciency gains to consumers. A similar but slightly more subtle intuition applies in the case of
greeneld FDI.
We also show the importance of the pre-existing level of domestic competition when
evaluating the impact of FDI and trade on markups and prices. Higher domestic entry results
in fewer rms charging the maximum markup, leaving less room for foreign competitors to
challenge high prot margins in the domestic market. Thus, trade liberalization and FDI
have a bigger eect on markups and prices in countries or industries with small pools of rivals,
a situation that we call low contestability. The number of rivals in the market at the point of
sale is critical in determining the degree of passthrough, as Atkeson and Burstein (2007 and
2008) and Garetto (2009) nd in numerical simulations within a 2-country model. Atkeson
and Burstein (2007) note that to simulate the model one must choose the number of rivals
in each industry, an issue not touched upon in BEJK. By generalizing BEJK to include the
number of rivals, we provide formulas to characterize the degree of passthrough based on the
4We are grateful to Claudia Buch for pointing out that although we can not measure the degree of entry,
since it involves one active rm and an unobserved number of latent rivals, the level of market concentration
is a sucient statistic to capture it. Thus, previous empirical analyses of pricing behavior and market
concentration are quite relevant to our model.
3degree of competition. Using these formulas, we are able to show that imperfect competition
also may explain dierences in the relative frequency of price adjustments across markets.
In summary, we build a model that reconciles stylized facts on markups and prices from
a diverse set of studies. The goal is to nd an algebraic representation for the distribution
of markups that permits us to produce markups that fall under trade liberalization, rise
with foreign ownership, and are positively correlated with market concentration. We want
markup behavior to result in prices that are set dierently across countries, yield sluggish (less
frequent) export price changes and incomplete pass-through for exports when marginal costs
change{ with greater pass-through for the most frequent price adjusters and which in some
cases generates more frequent price changes for rms in markets with higher concentration.
We want to accomplish this within a tractable framework allowing us to quantify algebraically
and endogenously the proportion of rms likely to change their prices at any given time.
Section 2 presents a simple closed economy model with analytical solutions for the dis-
tribution of markups and prices which include the number of rivals. We show the dierence
between the eect of sectoral versus idiosyncratic shocks on the size and frequency of price
changes. Section 3 considers the implications of trade in goods without FDI for these distri-
butions. In Section 4, we contrast this case of trade in goods only with that of FDI when
no goods are traded, illustrating the boost that FDI gives to markups in the host country.
We briey discuss why intra-rm trade might motivate strategic takeovers that would in-
crease markups in the case of export-platform FDI. We save discussion of empirical studies
of markups and pricing until Sections 2, 3, and 4 to show the relevance of our theoretical
results. Section 5 concludes.
2 Autarky
The heart of the model lies in the production of intermediate goods by heterogeneous rms.
For simplicity, we assume that producers of the nal good are perfectly competitive and
simply assemble the intermediate goods, with no additional capital or labor necessary. The
continuum of intermediate goods j spans the xed interval [0,1]. The assembly process uses














4with elasticity of substitution  greater than one. The demand for an individual input is




















Each producer of an intermediate good draws an eciency parameter z from a cumulative
distribution F(z) with positive support over the interval (0,1]. Eaton and Kortum (2009,
Chapter 4) describe a process whereby over time, F(z) can emerge as a frontier distribution
representing the eciency levels associated with the best surviving ideas available to produce
a particular good j. Being the distribution of the best surviving ideas, F(z) naturally takes
on an extreme value form and under mild assumptions, it can be characterized by a Fr echet
distribution.5 Thus, we assume that an endogenous number of rms r each draw an eciency
parameter from a distribution given by
F(z) = 1   e
 Tz 
:
We assume that T > 0 and also that the shape parameter, , is no less than  1 to ensure the
existence of certain moments of interest below. Only the most ecient rm with eciency
level Z1(j) in any industry supplies the market. This eciency parameter increases the level
of output a rm produces from one unit of a composite input Q:
Y (j) = Z1(j)Q(j):
Marginal cost for this most ecient rm, C1(j), is inversely related to the eciency
5In particular, EK suppose that each period a group of new ideas emerges with the quality of these ideas
distributed as Pareto. Over time, the distribution of the best (lowest cost) idea from each period then
becomes Weibull. More generally, BEJK (2003) state that if rms draw from this frontier distribution, the
lowest cost (the rst order statistic) takes on a Weibull distribution. We note that the rst order statistic of
a Weibull distribution is also Weibull, so the underlying distribution from which rms are drawing their cost
parameters can be reasonably modeled as Weibull, as we do here. Costs and eciency levels are simply the
inverse of one another, so that assumption implies that eciency levels take on an inverse Weibull distribution.
The Fr echet distribution is isomorphic to an inverse Weibull distribution and we can equivalently describe
the distribution from which rms draw their eciency levels as Fr echet. We do only this to match the model






which accounts for both the cost of the composite input w = !p1 , with ! being the labor
wage rate and p the cost of a bundle of intermediate goods, and any frictions involved in
sending intermediate goods to the assemblers of the nal good, d  1 . The cost parameter
drawn by any rm hoping to produce good j is distributed
G(c) = 1   e
 T(wd) c
:
Given that some number r rivals draw an eciency parameter hoping to be the low-cost
supplier of industry j, the distribution of the lowest cost C1(j) is6
G1(c1) = 1   e
 rT(wd) c
1: (1)
We assume that d equals one under autarky in this section and for domestic sales in the open
economy in Section 3.
2.1 The distribution of markups
Let C2(j) represent the unit cost of the second-best competitor in industry j, who sits
inactive but ready to begin production instantly should the opportunity arise. Given the
CES assembly technology for the nal good, the lowest-cost rm producing good j would like
to set a price that provides the maximum markup possible subject to demand| the CES
markup,  m  
 1 > 1. However, if charging the CES markup results in a price that exceeds
the marginal cost of the second-best competitor waiting in the wings, the lowest-cost supplier
may nd itself undersold. In short, no rm can charge a price that exceeds the unit cost of
its next best rival. The low-cost supplier in each industry j takes the prices of the low-cost








With this formula for the markup, we compute the expected output-weighted price for
6See Rinne (2009), p.237 for derivation. EK and BEJK simplify their frameworks by using the underlying
assumption that the number of rms competing to be the low-cost supplier in any industry is a random
variable with a Poisson distribution. It elegantly drops from the analysis, though one could possibly interpret
an increase in the technology parameter T in their model as an increase in the mean number of competitors
because T enters their Fr echet distribution of surviving ideas through the Poisson exponent.













Thus, the pricing rule depends not only upon the distribution of the rst and second order
statistic of the marginal costs, but also upon the distribution of the ratio of the two order
statistics. Rinne (2009, p.243) provides a formula for the distribution of
C1(j)
C2(j). We apply
a Jacobian transformation to obtain the distribution of
C2(j)
C1(j). Assuming that the frontier
distribution of eciency parameters is identical for every industry j, for values of the markup
less than  m the probability density of the markup is given by
h(m) =
r(r   1)m (+1)
[(r   1) + m ]
2 ; (2)
with a mass point at  m, since all cases where
C2(j)
C1(j) exceeds  m are assigned a value of  m.
Like the distribution of markups given in BEJK, this distribution is entirely independent




a Pareto density for markups identical to the one in BEJK. However, because we explicitly
include the number of rivals r| rather than elegantly integrating it out to focus on the role
of gravity in a Ricardian setting as they do| we see that the distribution of markups is
directly aected by the number of rms competing to be the low-cost supplier, a measure
which we call contestability, drawing on work by Claessens and Laeven (2004) and de Blas
and Russ (2010). One can conceptualize r as an exogenous policy parameter, as in the
numerical analysis by Atkeson and Burstein (2007 and 2008) and de Blas and Russ (2010),
or endogenize it using a free entry condition as in Melitz (2003). The key is that unlike
models using a Pareto distribution of rm eciency parameters, the degree of entry embodied
in r changes the shape of the entire distribution of markups, costs, and rm size. Because  m
is the upperbound imposed by the nested CES structure, integrating h(m) over values from
7 m to 1 gives the probability that a rm will charge the maximum CES markup,





1 + (r   1) m: (4)
Note that as  m goes from its own upperbound of 1 (for  = 1) to its lowerbound of 1 (for
 ! 1), this probability moves monotonically from 0 to 1, so it is a well behaved cumulative
distribution function over the range of possible markups.
Proposition 1: The average markup is decreasing in contestability r under autarky.
Proof: For any given markup 1  m0   m, the probability that M(j) =
C2(j)
C1(j) is greater than
or equal to m0 is decreasing in r:




1 + (r   1)(m0) < 0:
Equivalently, we can say that the distribution of markups when r is low rst-order stochasti-
cally dominates the distribution of markups with a higher r. First-order stochastic dominance
implies a higher expected value; therefore, E[M(j)] is decreasing in r.
Corollary 1:The fraction of rms charging the maximum markup is decreasing in con-
testability r under autarky.
Proof: The proof of Proposition 1 for any 1  m0   m also applies for  m and markups
are set equal to  m whenever M(j) would be greater than  m without the restriction of the
CES upperbound.
As the number of rivals in an industry j increases, both the average markup and the
probability that rms will be able to charge the maximum markup falls| increased rivalry
squeezes markups. Intuitively, as we show below, the result emerges because on average,
increasing the number of rivals diminishes the dierence between the costs of the two best
potential suppliers. Further, equation (2) reveals that our team of rivals is crucial in deter-
mining the shape of the distribution as long as the number of rivals is nite. To illustrate,
Figure 1 shows the distribution of markups if r equals its minimum value of 2, versus 20, the
number of rivals chosen by Atkeson and Burstein (2007) by calibration to match U.S. indus-
try concentration. We use =3.6 and =3.79, as estimated by BEJK. The number of rms
charging the maximum markup falls drastically, from one-half to just over one-third. We will
discuss the implications of this statistic for price rigidity but rst, we use the distribution of
8markups to compute the aggregate price level.
Figure 1: Increasing the number of rivals reduces markups
2.2 The distribution of prices
As shown in de Blas and Russ (2010), the joint distribution for the rst and second order
statistic also contains the contestability measure r:













To nd the marginal distribution for C1(j) (C2(j)), one can integrate the joint distribution
over values of c2 (c1) from 0 to 1. We nd that increasing the number of rivals leads, on
average, to lower costs in the industry. We compute a particular moment of interest, 1   ,

































Taking the derivative of E[C1(j)1 ] and E[C2(j)1 ] with respect to r, we nd that the























In other words, the second-lowest cost is falling in r faster than the lowest cost, demonstrating
how increases in contestability can reduce markups. Because the distribution of the markup
is independent of outcomes for the individual order statistics C1(j) and C2(j), we can compute
the expected price P(j)1  as
E[P(j)
1 ] = Pr[M(j) >  m]  m
1 E[C1(j)
1 ] + Pr[M(j)   m]E[C2(j)
1 ];
which is also increasing in r. Since rms in all industries draw from the same underlying
















Proposition 2: The aggregate price level is decreasing in the level of contestability r
under autarky for   1 and      1.
Proof: Intuitively, this is true because an increase in r shifts the distribution of markups
to the left at the same time it reduces the rst- and second-lowest unit costs on average.
More rigorously, taking the derivative of p1  = E[P(j)1 ] yields
@[p1 ]
@r
= Pr[M(j)   m]
@E[( mC1(j))1 ]
@r












The rst two terms on the right-hand side are positive, while it has been shown above
that the probability of charging the maximum markup is falling in r, making its partial
derivative negative. The derivative
@[p1 ]
@r is positive and p1  is increasing in r as long as
E[( mC1)1 ]  E[C
1 
2 ]. Using the expressions for E[C2(j)1 ] and E[C1(j)1 ] derived
above, we see this is possible whenever r 
 ( 1)
  1. Assuming that there are at least two
competitors in each industry, this sucient condition is satised by our assumption that
     1.
The assumption that      1 is akin to the assumption in Ghironi and Melitz (2005)
10that the Pareto shape parameter be at least as large as    1 to ensure the existence of the
moments used to compute the aggregate price level and plays the exact same role here. In
economic terms, the assumption means that the dispersion in rm cost parameters can not
be too great relative to the need for a variety of inputs into nal goods production. (See
Anderson, de Palma, and Thisse (1987) for a discussion in the context of consumption.) Oth-
erwise, nal goods producers would be too sensitive to variations in price across intermediate
goods and one very ecient intermediate good manufacturer would absorb the entire market
share, leading to a degenerate distribution of rm eciency levels. Thus, under autarky, the
aggregate price level p is decreasing in the number of rivals r under standard constraints on
the parameters  and .
2.3 The number of rivals
In this section, we present the free entry condition that pins down the solution for r. The
distribution of costs is the same for rms competing in any market niche j within a particular
country, so from this point we drop the index j. We follow the existing literature by using P
and Y to refer to the price of an individual good and the output of an individual rm. The
lowercase letters p and y refer to the aggregate price level and aggregate output.
A free entry condition limits the number of rivals r competing to be the low-cost producer
of any good j. Following Melitz (2003), we assume that there is a uniform probability of
death, 0 <  < 1, in every period and that a startup cost must be paid by the active supplier
of each good in the rst period that the rm begins supplying the market. This startup cost
is equal to a fraction of output, 0 <  < 1, in the rst period of active production.7 In
equilibrium, the number of rivals must be such that the expected present discounted value






t+s (Pt+sYt+s   C1Yt+s)
#
 C1Yt;
yielding the steady-state expression
E[M1 ]
E[M ]
= (1 + ):
7Demidova, Kee, and Krishna (2006) report the average revenues of Bangladeshi textile manufacturers as
just over $4million, while Cherkashin, Demidova, Kee, and Krishna (2009) estimate the size of their upfront
entry cost as $408,500, suggesting a  of 10%. It is likely to be much higher for capital-intensive industries.
Dunne, Roberts, and Samuelson (1988) report average exit rates () among US rms between 42% and 50%
in a sample from 1963 and 1982. Thus, we would expect 1+ to be no less than 1.05 and much higher for
capital-intensive industries.
11In Appendix A.1, we show that the left hand side is decreasing in r, resulting in a unique
equilibrium solution. More intuitively, if an innite number of entrepreneurs were to compete
in the industry, the markup would fall to 1, with zero marginal prot and negative expected
net prot because the most ecient producer would still have to pay the startup cost. Thus,
in equilibrium, there must be some nite number of rivals such that expected net prot is
zero.
Recall that the probability of forced exit is independent of rm eciency and that the
distribution of the markup is independent of the distribution of costs,8 so the free entry
condition reduces to
E[lnM]  ln(1 + ):
Noting that E[M]  lnE[M] and using Jensen's inequality, we have
E[M]  lnE[M]  E[lnM]  ln(1 + ) (5)
Proposition 1 tells us that the mean markup, E[M], is decreasing in the number of rivals. This
means that rivals will keep \entering" the industry (i.e., draw a productivity parameter) as
long as the markup a rival expects to charge, if it is the low-cost supplier, generates expected
prots equal to the discounted startup cost. Since the mean markup is decreasing in the
number of rivals r, it is clear that the maximum number of rivals is decreasing in the xed
cost parameter  and the exit rate .
The distribution of the markup derived above does not yield a closed-form solution for the
expected markup E[M] or for the expected log markup, E[lnM]. However, we can determine
an upper- and lowerbound for r. Specically, we can express the minimum number of rivals
as a function of the expected log markup and derive a clean closed form solution for the
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1 + (r   1)e  m:
8To see this, note that the cost parameters Ck do not enter into the expression for h(m) for k 2 N.
12Using a generalized version of Chebyshev's inequality9, we can characterize a lowerbound for
the number of rivals:
 mPr[lnM   m]  E[lnM]
r  m
1 + (r   1)e  m  E[lnM]
r 
E[lnM](e  m   1)
E[lnM]e  m    m
:
As noted previously, the expected markup and the number of rivals is inversely related, a
relationship seen here in the lowerbound for r. When E[M] falls, the lowerbound increases,
reecting the fact that more rivals will enter when the expected markup is high (and vice
versa). We know from equation (5) that the expected log gross markup E[lnM] must be
at least as large as the gross log per-period cost of production, ln(1 + ), producing an
upperbound for r. Thus, we know that r lies within these bounds:
ln(1 + )
 
e  m   1

ln(1 + )e  m    m
 r 
E[lnM](e  m   1)
E[lnM]e  m    m
:
When either the xed cost parameter  or the probability of default  increase, the maximum
number of rivals falls. Note also from equation (1) that increasing the number of rivals acts
as a positive technology shock, just as increasing T would. 10
2.4 Market concentration and pricing behavior
In Appendix B, we show that having a lower number of rivals not surprisingly results in higher
market concentration. What is less obvious is that a lower number of rivals leads to more
frequent price changes. The reason is clear from Figure 1. When r is low, more rms charge
the maximum CES markup{ their prices are not tightly bounded by the marginal costs of
their next-best rival so they are better able to pass on idiosyncratic increases in marginal cost
to their customers. The fraction of rms that set their price equal to the marginal cost of the
next-best rival are unable to do this. Thus, we would expect a positive relationship between
market concentration and frequency of price changes, as shown by Schoenle (2010, Tables 19,
20, and 21).11 In addition, since rms will not change prices in response to an idiosyncratic
9See Theorem 5 in Mood, Graybill, and Boes (1974, p.71): For a random variable X, a nonnegative
function g(), and a scalar k > 0, then kP[g(X)  k]  E[g(X)].
10Normalizing the wage ! to equal 1, the model is easily closed by imposing a labor market clearing
condition. We do this in Appendix C.1 to compare output levels under autarky versus free trade.
11At the end of this section, we explain why the relationship between concentration and frequency may
not always be robust.
13shock unless they charge the maximum markup, Figure 1 suggests that at least half of rms
will never be able to change their prices ever, unless they experience a shock common to all
rivals and which aects all rivals at exactly the same time. This is consistent with results
from Nakamura and Steinsson (2010), who nd that no price changes are observed for 40% of
products over the period 1982-2007, as well as Gopinath and Rigobon (2008) and Gopinath,
Itskhoki, and Rigobon (2010), who report static prices for approximately 30% of their sample.
Corollary 2: Increased contestability reduces rms' ability to adjust prices in response
to idiosyncratic shocks.
Proof: For some random i.i.d. shock " to rm-specic marginal cost with probability
density v("), we can compute the fraction of rms that will raise prices in response to an
idiosyncratic increase in marginal costs. Suppose that we assume an increase in " increases
marginal cost for an active rm, but not its rivals. First, we note that only rms charging
the maximum CES markup would be able to increase their prices, since rms setting prices
bounded by the marginal cost of their next-best rival can not. Then, the probability that a
rm will pass an idiosyncratic increase in marginal cost fully to buyers by raising its price is
equal to the probability that the current price ( m times marginal cost) times the shock does
not exceed the marginal cost of the next best rival,






= Pr[M   m"]:
Since the distribution of markups is independent of ", we can compute this probability as










1 + (r   1)(" m)
v(")d" (6)
It follows from Corollary 1 that regardless of the probability distribution for ", as long as the
marginal cost shock is independent of the markup, the probability of full pass-through under
autarky is decreasing in the number of rivals.12 Multiplying " above by some positive con-
stant less than one, we see that the result is general to any degree of pass-through, not just
full pass-through.13 The intuition also applies for a downward cost shock, which is omitted
12That is, given the calculus used to prove Proposition 1, equation (6) implies that the probability of the
markup being high enough to permit adjustment to positive price shocks is decreasing in the number of rivals
r.
13Our assumption that rms pay a xed portion of rst-period output when they become active prevents
14here for the sake of brevity. In this case, all rms charging the maximum markup would have
to lower their prices, otherwise their markup would rise above  m, impling marginal revenues
less than marginal costs. Further, some portion of rms charging a price equal to C2 would
also lower prices, those for whom leaving the price at C2 resulted in a markup greater than
 m. Thus, downward adjustment is most likely when rms are more likely to have relatively
inecient rivals, which is the case when r is low.
2.5 The type of shocks
Taken together, Bils and Klenow (2004), Gopinath and Itskhoki (2010), and Hellerstein
and Goldberg (2010) suggest that while large rms change prices more frequently, the link
between frequency and market concentration is not robust. In our model, changes in marginal
costs that aect an entire sector j{ for instance, due to uctuations in the labor wage or
some sectoral eciency parameter{ in principle could apply equally and at the exact same
time to all rivals in sector j, active and latent, and have no impact on markups at all.
Sectoral shocks would be passed fully to the customer, resulting in more frequent price
uctuations than idiosyncratic shocks, where a fraction of rms is unable to raise prices if
costs increase. The weak link between concentration and frequency of price changes might
be explained if rms in highly concentrated industries are more subject to idiosyncratic
rather than sectoral shocks. Empirical studies indicate that idiosyncratic shocks are likely
to be prevalent and economically important: Gabaix (2010) nds that a substantial portion
of observed aggregate uctuations in U.S. output can be explained by idiosyncratic shocks
falling across a distribution of heterogeneous rms, while Foster, Haltiwanger, and Syverson
(2008) determine that idiosyncratic shocks hitting plants have a standard deviation 5 times
as large as that of industry-level productivity shocks. So idiosyncratic shocks are likely to be
important from a macroeconomic perspective.
The discussion of pricing rigidities in the face of idiosyncratic shocks also pertains to
shocks aecting the wider macroeconomy. A macroeconomic productivity shock may take
time to lter through all sectors and to each rm in every sector, possibly never reaching some
rms at all. Even a widespread technological advance could generate changes in relative costs
consistent with a degree of price rigidity in some sectors, particularly if there are xed costs
involved in upgrading production techniques to take advantage of a scientic breakthrough
the lowest-cost producer from having to adjust prices in response to temporary idiosyncratic shocks hitting
its next-best rivals. The rivals will not nd it protable to try to undercut an existing producer unless they
experience a transitory shock large enough to cover the entire xed cost. We assume that the variance of
costs is small enough that the likelihood of such a large shock is negligible.
15or a sudden increase in labor eciency. The same subtleties apply to monetary policy. A
change in the Fed Funds rate may aect sectors and individual rms within sectors dierently
or with varying lags according to their level of capital intensiveness, the transaction costs
involved in their mode of access to external credit, or the monopoly power involved in their
individual relationships with banks. It is beyond the scope of this paper to model dierential
eects of macroeconomic shocks across sectors and rms. Our point is merely that to the
degree macroeconomic shocks generate some idiosyncratic changes in relative costs between a
rst- and second- best rival, our formula for the distribution of markups suggests that we are
likely to observe sluggish or severely limited price adjustment by a nontrivial fraction of rms
under Bertrand competition regardless of the source of shocks. Below, we show analytically
that exporters on average will have less ability to adjust their prices than domestic producers.
3 Trade in goods
Here we demonstrate that trade not only shifts production toward lower-cost producers in
the classic Ricardian sense, but also reduces markups in countries with low contestability,
lowering the aggregate price level for all trading partners. This squeeze on markups generates
a gain from trade that is new to the BEJK framework. Trade also invites increased domestic
entry (a higher r), which reduces markups, generating a second gain from trade that is new
to the BEJK framework, though not to Bergin and Feenstra (2008), Melitz and Ottaviano
(2005), or Rodriguez (2010). Furthermore, an increase in entry by itself can shift the distri-
bution of eciency levels among active rms to the right, an eect not captured by either
BEJK, Bergin and Feenstra (2008), Melitz and Ottaviano (2005), or Rodriguez (2010). The
increase in entry acts both as a technological advance and an increase in contestability. Thus
when there are no multinationals present, trade always reduces the prices of imported goods
relative to autarky and reduces the prices of domestically produced goods as increasing the
number of domestic rivals increases average eciency. We will also show how geography, in
the form of trade frictions, interferes with all three of these sources of welfare gains.
Again, we drop the industry index j to simplify notation. This is possible because in
both autarky and the open economy, the same distributions apply to each industry within
a particular country. We add the subscript n to the notation Ck(j), gk(c), etc., from the
autarkic case to denote the supplier of a good j to country n from country i with the kth
lowest cost, so that the corresponding notation becomes Ckni, gkni(c), etc., where k is a
positive integer. The variable CTR
kn denotes the supplier to country n with the kth lowest cost
under trade, with corresponding cumulative distribution and probability density GTR
kn (ck) and
gTR
kn (ck). We assume that Eaton and Kortum's no arbitrage condition for trade costs holds:
16dni < duidnu.
GTR
1n (c1) is the probability that the low-cost supplier of a good j to the home country
n has a marginal cost less than or equal to some level c1 under trade. The probability is
equal to one minus the probability that any potential supplier (including the one in the
home country) has a marginal cost greater than c1. The cumulative distribution for low-cost
suppliers under trade is thus
G
TR
1n (c1) = Pr[C
TR













and dni  1 is an iceberg trade cost involved in shipping goods from country i to country n
for i 6= n. It is straightforward to show that the probability that a country exports to n is
the same as in Eaton and Kortum (2002) and BEJK, but allowing for the number of rivals:





3.1 Geography and markups
We can compute the full distribution of markups under costly trade with asymmetric coun-
tries. Let  ni be the probability that the two best rivals to supply country n both originate
in country i. Then, it must be that the two best rivals in a particular industry in country i
are more ecient (have lower marginal costs) than any other potential suppliers of the good














The full distribution of markups in country n under trade, hTR
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17where hi(m) is simply the distribution of markups in country i as given under autarky and
h
TR;D
ni (m), derived in Appendix C, is the distribution of markups when the rst- and second-
best suppliers are from two dierent countries, i and u 6= i, respectively.
The distribution h
TR;D







where  niu =
ruTu(wudnu) 
TR
n  riTi(widni)  is the probability that the second-best rival to country i when
supplying a particular good to country n is from country u 6= i, and hniu(m) is the distribution






We derive this distribution in Appendix C, but here focus on the resulting probability that the
supplier charges the maximum markup when its next-best rival is an exporter in a dierent
country,
Pr[Mniu   m] =
riTi(widni) 
riTi(widni)  + ruTu(wudnu)   m: (9)
One can see immediately that the supplier to country n exporting from country i will be
more likely to charge the maximum markup when its next-best rival (1) resides in a country
far from the destination country n (high dnu), or (2) resides in a country with low contesta-
bility, low technology, or a high wage relative to country i. The country-i supplier's own
distance from the destination country lowers the probability that it can charge the maximum
markup. If all countries are identical, this probability that a rm in i supplying country n
charges the maximum markup when its next best rival is in a third country u 6= i reduces
to 1
1+  m, which is easily shown to be lower than the probability under autarky in equation
(4). Thus, the only way that markups would increase under trade is if the home country n
opened its borders to trade with a world dominated by one country that was much closer
than other trading partners (low dni) and were far superior to all other countries by having
much lower labor input costs (low !i), or very advanced technology (high Ti). What is more,
equation (8) implies that reducing the trade cost dni for one particular country i increases the
probability that a foreign suppliers from i will be able to charge their full autarkic markup
when selling to country n, yielding an important argument for multilateral trade negotiations.
14See Mood, Graybill and Boes (1974, pp.187-88) for a description of the transformation method used to
nd the distribution of the quotient of two random variables.
18Lemma 1: Trade lowers the aggregate price level.
Proof: A country will never import a good with a higher price than it pays under autarky
and the second-best competitor will never be less ecient than the second-best competitor
































































which is strictly greater than its counterparts under autarky. We also can compute the same
(1-)th moment for the marginal cost of the second-best rival by using the probability that




















which we know is at least as great as its counterpart under autarky because the second-best
rival producer of a good j in the entire world (including the home country) by denition
could not have a marginal cost any higher than the second-best rival under autarky.
Under costly trade, the markups that rms charge are dierent when they sell domestically
compared to when they export. The formula for the distribution of markups, hTR
n (m), reveals
that they internalize a portion of the trade cost, unless they are so technologically superior or
have such a huge unit input cost advantage that they can pass the entire cost on to the foreign
consumer. We demonstrated that the probability of charging the maximum markup is lower
when one's next best rival is from a dierent country. The eect of incremental reductions
in the trade cost on the import penetration ratio is no longer a constant, which Arkolakis,
Costinot, and Rodriguez-Clare (2010) report is the case for the BEJK model without entry.
More formally, prots are no longer a constant share of revenues, independent of the variable
trade cost. Instead, the share of prots in total revenues varies with the variable trade cost d,
shrinking as d falls and rms are forced to charge lower markups due to competition from new
foreign and possibly new domestic entrants. This violates the gravity restriction satised by
many trade models, even though the probability of exporting to any country n, ni, appears
19very similar to the export equations in Eaton and Kortum (2002) and BEJK.15 Put more
simply, the gains from trade liberalization can not be inferred from the value of aggregate
ows alone because liberalization reduces markups, distorting the relationship between the
trade cost and observed expenditures.
As in the variable-markup frameworks of Bergin and Feenstra (2000), Melitz and Ot-
taviano (2005) and Feenstra and Weinstein (2009), entry changes the eective elasticity of
demand (the price-elasticity of marginal revenues), even though the Dixit-Stiglitz elasticity
of demand governing the upperbound for the markup is a constant. Thus, trade liberalization
has the potential to create welfare gains not only through productivity-based comparative
advantage, but also by reducing rms' market power. We close the model and show output
growth under free trade versus autarky in Appendix C.1, but save detailed analysis of gains
from trade with variable markups in this generalized Ricardian setting for future research
and in order to focus our analysis on entry, pricing behavior, and the aggregate price level.
To the degree that trade induces new entry (increased r), it shifts the entire distribution
of marginal costs to the left, similar to an innovation in available technology T. A particu-
larly clean case occurs when countries are identical and that trade is costless.
Proposition 3: In a world with symmetric countries, free trade (a) reduces the aggregate
price level, (b) increases the number of domestic rivals in each country, and (c) reduces the
probability that rms will charge the maximum markup.
Proof: To illustrate more intuitively how trade aects the full distribution of markups,
it is useful to suppose for a moment that countries are identical and trade is costless, so
that Ti = T, !i = !  1, and dni = 1 for all i: Then we see that the distribution for the
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which is observationally equivalent to a world with R = rN rivals who all draw from an
15The reason is clear when one writes the formula for the expenditure by country n on goods from country
i relative to domestically produced goods. Explicitly, the ratio of country n expenditures on any good from








where Mni is the markup charged by a supplier from country i when selling in country n. Taking the
expectation of this expression, the ratio of the expected markup only cancels out in the case of costless trade
and varies with the level of the trade cost, separately from the unit costs. The derivative of the ratio with
respect to trade costs is not constant, as it enters the distribution of markups charged by home and foreign
rms dierently, nonlinearly, and nonseparably.
20underlying distribution that takes the same form as the distribution of cost parameters for
any individual country, GTR(c) = 1   e Tc.16 The distribution of markups in this special
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The implication is clear: trade has the same eect on the distribution of markups as increas-
ing contestability and therefore reduces the number of rms charging the maximum markup
and, all else equal, the aggregate price level, which takes the same form as under autarky,
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than its counterpart underautarky, revealing that the aggregate price level falls under trade:
pTR
n < pautarky.
Part b) To show that the number of rivals under trade equals a number R > Nrautarky,
we use the free entry condition. The probability of exporting to a country n can be used to






















< 1+, it is clear that the possibility
of exporting strictly increases entry.18 Thus, leaping from autarky to free trade increases the
16The distribution of rst order statistics for samples drawn from a Weibull distrubution is also Weibull.
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21number of domestic rivals, in addition to reducing prices by reallocating production to more
ecient producers. This is the case as long as the xed costs of entering foreign markets are
less than the xed cost to enter domestic production, .19 Estimation of the xed industry
entry cost and the foreign market access cost by Cherashin, Demidova, Kee, and Krishna
(2009) suggest this condition does hold in reality, as the industry entry cost is between 3 and
50 times larger than the foreign market access cost for their sample of Bangladeshi textile
producers.
Part c) It follows directly from the calculus in Proposition 1 and the fact that R > rautarky
that the average markup falls under trade. Similarly, the likelihood of charging the maximum
markup falls when opening to trade.
The results from Proposition 3 echo those of Bergin and Feenstra (2000) and Melitz and
Ottaviano (2008), but now within the homothetic preference structure of Bernard, Eaton,
Jensen, and Kortum (2002). Atkeson and Burstein (2007 and 2008) show the results in
Parts (a) and (c) numerically, while de Blas and Russ (2010) demonstrate that increasing
the number of rivals reduces the impact of trade liberalization on markups. Note also that
increasing the number of trading partners has a similar eect to increasing the number
of rivals in any trading partner, seen in numerical solutions calculated by Garetto (2010).
Under costless trade, it does not matter how the rivals are distributed across countries.
Markups respond as though all entrants worldwide compete on equal footing to be the low-
cost supplier. As in classic studies of trade and endogenous market structure, geographic
frictions here increase market power, dampening the eect of foreign industrial structure on
domestic markups and prices.
3.2 Trade and prices
The expressions for markup behavior in the previous section yield pricing-to-market, incom-
plete pass-through, and the closely related facts that rms change prices on exported goods
less frequently and with less synchronization relative to prices in the domestic market. Atke-
son and Burstein (2007 and 2008) describe in brilliant detail the manner in which numerical
simulations of BEJK and an innovative new quantity-based competitive framework result in
pricing-to-market and incomplete passthrough, matching them with data on pricing behav-
ior. Here, we demonstrate similar results algebraically. First, pricing-to-market is evident
the formula for hTR
n (m) and both of its components, hi(m) and hniu(m). Unless trade is
costless, rms can charge higher markups in their home markets than abroad because trade
19Here, we assume the xed cost of exporting is zero for simplicity.
22costs increase their domestic market power, as discussed above. The formulas also depict how
rms set markups depending on the proximity of other export competitors in a particular
destination market, if their next best rival is another exporter. Second, as under autarky,
rms will only fully pass an increase in marginal cost to buyers in export market n if (1) they
are already charging the maximum markup and (2) the price increase would not surpass the
marginal cost of the next-best rival to supply country n. Although the logic is quite general,
we can show this mathematically if we again invoke symmetry.
Suppose again that there is a shock to marginal cost " such that a drop in " reduces
































1 + (r   1)(" m)




1 + (" m)
v(")d";
where   = r 1
N . Since r
1+(r 1)("  m) > 1
1+("  m) for any r  2 and m  1, and r is at least as
















autarkic counterpart given by equation (6). Therefore, the probability of full passthrough of
cost shocks under trade must be less than the probability of full passthrough under autarky.
The same can be shown for any degree of partial passthrough, as well.20
For the case where countries are not symmetric, our markup formulas demonstrate results
described in the numerical simulations of Garetto (2009). As we noted above from (9),
the probability that a rm charges the maximum markup (and as a result, the degree of
passthrough) in an export market is greater when the exporting country has a higher level
of technology T or a lower wage ! than its competitor's source country. Thus, we show
the point Garetto (2009) argues{ \rms should do less pricing-to-market when exporting to
relatively more productive (richer) countries."
3.2.1 Frequency and synchronization of price changes
On a related point from a separate literature, we can see that the frequency of price changes
will be smaller in export markets than in domestic markets. Unless an exporting country has
20Although several studies have shown that passthrough depends on the choice of currency invoicing,
Goldberg and Tille (2009) demonstrate that this currency invoicing choice also depends on the degree of
competition, so we view our market structure approach as quite relevant.
23a huge advantage in the form of high T, high r, or low labor costs, it is harder for rms to
charge the maximum markup in an export market compared to their native market due to
the trade cost, which eectively increases their marginal cost relative to domestic rms in the
destination country. Since rms must be charging the maximum markup in order to pass on
idiosyncratic or country-specic shocks in the form of higher export prices, fewer rms will
change prices in export markets (as compared to their native market) when marginal costs
increase. As a consequence, the median and average frequency of price changes must be lower
for exports, as shown by Schoenle (2010) and Fitzgerald and Haller (2010). More intuitively,
trade costs eat away a portion of rms' markups, giving them less leeway to adjust prices in
response to increases in marginal costs.
Finally, Schoenle (2010) reports that export price changes are less synchronized than
domestic price changes. Trade costs can generate this eect in the same way they reduce the
frequency of price changes. However, the dichotomy could also come about because when
marginal costs are subject to country-specic shocks, all domestic rivals experience the same
shock, making it more likely that a rm can adjust its domestic price even if it is not charging
the maximum markup. In contrast, rivals in the export markets more likely would be subject
to shocks specic to their own native countries, forcing exporters to absorb domestic cost
increases in the form of reduced prots when selling abroad. Notice that exchange rate
uctuations apply more broadly to exporters from multiple countries, and therefore are more
likely to be passed on to buyers than source-country-specic shocks to marginal costs.21 The
issue relates to observations by Gopinath and Itskhoki (2010), who nd that the frequency of
price adjustment is positively correlated with the degree of exchange rate passthrough. This
is true in our model, as the most frequent price adjusters among exporters are those who are
able to charge the maximum markup in the foreign market, giving them the greatest degree
of passthrough. As discussed above, rms charging the maximum markup are most able to
pass through shocks to their relative marginal costs, including those arising from exchange
rate movements.
3.2.2 A note on generality
Atkeson and Burstein (2008) point out that if products are less than perfect substitutes,
the endogenous markup behavior of rms depicted here breaks down and markups become
the CES constant once again, questioning the generality of the BEJK framework. This is a
reasonable criticism. However, we argue that at some level of disaggregation, products will
21This argument applies only when trade costs are positive, as positive trade costs make it more likely that
markups in the domestic markup are bounded by a domestic rival, rather than a foreign one. In a symmetric
world with costless trade, the second-best rival is equally likely to be domestic or foreign rm and on average
price changes would appear equally synchronized across markets.
24be extremely close substitutes. Even if all upper layers of the CES nesting involve nite
elasticities of substitution, the impact of endogenous markups from an underlying level of
perfect substitutes would have similar implications for the frequency of observed price changes
and the behavior of the aggregate price level, as long as the goods with prices characterized
by endogenous markups were assembled in the country where they are consumed as part of
the nal good.22 The location where intermediate goods are assembled is a critical factor in
determining how the endogenous markup behavior aects relative prices and pass-through
across countries. Our model assumes, like BEJK and Atkeson and Burstein (2008), that
intermediate goods are assembled in the same country where the nal good is consumed.
How disaggregate do product categories have to be for goods to be close substitutes? In a
structural estimation of the Atkeson and Burstein (2008) model, which uses quantity-based
competition but the same nested CES framework as in BEJK and Atkeson and Burstein
(2007), Edmond, Midrigan, and Xu (2009) estimate that the elasticity of substitution for
the intermediate goods is 8.7 for goods within the 4-digit SIC level (goods are identied at
the 7-digit SIC level) among rms in the Taiwan Annual Manufacturing Survey.23 While the
number 8.7 is obviously much lower than innity, in terms of the implied markup it is not
so far away: the markup shoots toward innity when the elasticity of substitution between
the goods of rival rms approaches 1, but it tends toward zero as the elasticity approaches
innity and already falls to 15% when the elasticity is 8. Their estimate of the elasticity is
just under 8 for simulations with price-based competition of the form in BEJK. So even at an
intermediate level of disaggregation, goods are already very close substitutes when analyzed
in the context of a Ricardian model with endogenous markups.24
We focus on the Weibull distribution here due to its frequent use in international trade
and nance, the microfoundations for the emergence of such a technology laid out in Eaton
and Kortum (2009), and its tractability in deriving the distribution of markups. However,
22The idea of a constant markup being imposed at an upper retail level in the destination country is
consistent with ndings by Berger, Faust, Rogers, and Steverson (2009), who nd that the markup added
onto imported goods by distributers after the goods arrive at the dock is stable over time.
23There is a rich literature estimating the elasticity of substitution in the Dixit-Stiglitz (1977) framework
with a constant elasticity of substitution, but we omit discussion of it here, as we are focusing on estimates
implied by the type of model in this paper, a Ricardian model with endogenous markups.
24The probability density of markups resulting from the quantity-based competition in Atkeson and
Burstein (2008) for their preferred calibration also looks strikingly Pareto-like in shape. Edmond, Midri-
gan, and Xu (2009) show that their (quantity-based) Cournot competition produces a greater dispersion in
markups than the price-based Bertrand from BEJK, closer to the actual dispersion observed in their sample.
However, it is not clear whether this would be the case once one takes into account the Taiwanese producers
shipping to export markets, or the import competition within Taiwan's own domestic market, or calibrates
the number of rivals to match observed industry concentration as in Atkeson and Burstein (2008) rather than
by counting the number of suppliers of 7-digit micro-industries. We nd the study illuminating as the rst
to apply both Cournot and Bertrand competition in the Ricardian setting, running a horserace to explain
observed markups in rm-level data.
25any distribution will produce similar qualitative results as long as the ratio of its rst two
order statistics is decreasing in the sample size and for which the 1-th moments of the rst
two order statistics exists.
4 Foreign Direct Investment
In this section, we show a mechanism through which foreign-owned rms will have higher
markups on average, consistent with existing empirical studies. We focus here on a stylized
case without trade for clarity. The intuition originates in the work of Hymer (1960, 1976),
who states two principal factors that would compel a rm to control an enterprise in a foreign
country. The rst is to exploit rm-specic competencies or technological advantages. The
second is that it might be possible to eliminate the competition between them, increasing the
acquiror's market power. We mathematically demonstrate how the rst factor by itself can
generate higher markups among foreign-owned rms selling in the host country compared
to domestic rms (or compared to autarky). Then we discuss how introducing trade can
activate the second factor, further boosting markups for foreign-owned rms exporting to
the parent country or to third countries.
Advances in modern trade theory fomented several groundbreaking models to examine
the eects of technological advantages, including Helpman, Melitz, and Yeaple (2003) and
Nocke and Yeaple (2005). These models rely on a constant elasticity of substitution across
a continuum of goods to limit the market share of any individual rm, even if it is far
more ecient than its average rival. The love of variety prevents any rm from absorbing
the entire market share no matter how superior its technology or how low its price. These
studies provide an important window on the interesting tradeo between exporting and
investing abroad for greeneld foreign direct investment (FDI) and cross-border mergers
and acquisitions (M&A), showing that FDI allows the most technologically ecient rms
to capitalize upon their superiority. Tari-jumping gives multinationals an additional cost
advantage over exporters, boosting their market share above what the technological edge by
itself would imply. The Dixit-Stiglitz (1977) preference structure they use imposes a constant
markup in price setting. We show that FDI, whether in the form of M&As or greeneld
ventures, can increase markups in the host country through the vehicle of technological
transfer.
264.1 FDI and markups
Suppose that a country or industry is open to cross-border takeovers but not to trade. A
foreign rm can acquire a domestic one, replacing the domestic technology with its own.
An asterisk denotes prices, costs, and markups charged by foreign-owned rms in the host
country. To clarify the intuition behind the increase in markups that occurs as a result, we
rst suppose that no trade in goods occurs, forcing all production to be for local sale. For












1n is the lowest-cost draw among all foreign rms (originating in any of N 1 countries
outside of the home country n) for industry j. C
1n must be lower than C1n for an acquisition
to be protable for the parent rm, so the markup charged by a foreign-owned rm in the
home country will always be at least as large as the pre-takeover markup. The only case
where the markup would not increase after a takeover is when the target was already charging
the maximum markup  m: A takeover can be protable for a parent rm even in this case
because the parent applies its superior technology in the acquired plant, resulting in a lower
price ( mC
1 <  mC1) and greater sales, which allow it to buy out the target rm at a price
equal to the prots it would have earned had it not sold out, given the level of the aggregate
price index P that would prevail if all possible takeovers had occurred.
To calculate the distribution of the lowest cost rm among all foreign rms, we note the
probability that C
1n is less than or equal to some level c
1 > 0 is one minus the probability




1) be the cumulative distribution for the rm with the lowest cost among all foreign





























ni ri, ni represents frictions that prevent the seemless transfer of tech-






1 is the distribution of the lowest-cost draws for rms from country i pro-
25Here, we make use of the fact that the distribution of the lowest-cost draw among all foreign rms is
independent of draws by domestic rivals in the home country.
27ducing in country n after a cross-border takeover. We assume that Eaton and Kortum's no
arbitrage condition for trade costs also holds for technological hangups: ni < uinu.
Using the joint distribution, we exploit the methodology used in the case of trade above




















































1) and g2n(:) is dened exactly as in autarky, since the second-best
competitor is necessarily a domestic rm when there is no goods trade.26
Proposition 4: Foreign-owned rms acquired through M&As are more likely to charge
the maximum markup and charge higher markups on average than domestically owned rms.
Proof : We can integrate from  m to 1 to nd the probability that a foreign-owned rm
in n will charge the maximum markup,
Pr[M











n + (rn   1)Tn  m: (14)
Markups are increasing in the level of technology and contestability outside the home coun-
try, and decreasing in the degree of technological hangups involved in transferring technology
to foreign aliates. This probability is greater than the probability for domestically owned
rms (which is the same as under autarky and given in equation (4)) whenever 
n > Tn. This
condition holds as long as technological hangups are not too great and there is not too much
of a native technological advantage in the host country. It always holds under symmetry in a
world with seamless technology transfer. This logic also holds for rms charging any markup
between 1 and  m, so we can invoke stochastic dominance as in Proposition 1 to prove that
rms acquired by foreign parents charge higher markups on average.
26Because the distribution of the ratio C2n
C1n is independent of C1n, the distribution of the ratio is also
independent of the probability that C1n is greater than C
1n. This means that the marginal distribution





28The intuition behind the higher markups among merged rms is very simple: Suppose
the second-best rm supplying pencils in the home market n has marginal cost equal to 2,
while the rst-best has unit cost 1.5, with  = 3, yielding  m = 1:5. Then the markup under
autarky is simply 2=1:5 = 1: 3 If a parent rm with marginal cost, including hangups, buys
out the active domestic rm and transfers a lower unit cost, say 1.2, then the markup of the
merged rm will be minf2=1:2;  mg =  m.
Corollary: Foreign-owned rms founded through greeneld FDI are less likely to charge
the maximum markup than foreign-owned rms established through M&As in any country
and in some cases more likely than domestically owned rms.
Proof: The eect on markups is similar to that occuring with mergers and acquisitions.













n + rnTn  m;
which is strictly lower than the value for cross-border M&As given by equation (14). This
probability is only lower than the probability for domestic rms if

n
rnTn >  m
 m 1. Foreign
rms are more likely to charge the higher markup as long as the host country does not have
intense domestic rivalry or a keen technological advantage relative to foreigners and frictions
involved in technology transfer are not too large. The greeneld foreign entrant competes
against the best domestic rm in the host country niche, rather than the second-best, so it
faces stier domestic competition. However, it still comes from an intense competition within
the entire global pool of foreign rms. It not only has to be more ecient than the domestic
incumbent, it must be more ecient than any other foreign rm in its market niche in order
to undertake greeneld FDI without being driven out of the host country immediately by the
entry of a more ecient foreign rival. So it is still possible that the greeneld entrant will be




































29of business, particularly in a competitively or technologically disadvantaged country.
Merged and greeneld rms have lower costs, since the parent must be more ecient
than the target to aord the takeover. It is important to note that although the markup may
increase after a takeover or greeneld entry, the price charged for the good will never exceed
minfC2n;  mC
1ng. Since C2n has not changed and C
1n < C1n, the price charged for good j
in the host country may fall and will never increase, even if the markup does. The inuence
of domestic entry on markups under FDI is slightly dierent in the case of M&As versus
greeneld. An increase in domestic entry in the host country (rn) increases the probability
that a merged foreign-owned rm will charge the maximum markup, only because it increases
the probability that the target rm already charged the maximum markup. In contrast, an
increase in domestic entry reduces the probability that a greeneld foreign investor will charge
the maximum markup, as greater domestic rivalry increases the expected eciency of the
best domestic rms.
4.2 FDI inows
A prospective foreign entrant will prefer mergers to greeneld FDI whenever a merger will
increase the markup. It can engage in greeneld FDI whenever it has superior technology.
Therefore, the probability of foreign entry of some type is simply the probability that some
foreign country has a low-cost supplier with unit cost c1 (including the technological hangup
ni involved in mergers) given that the home country has a low-cost supplier of good j with
unit cost greater than c1. The probability that a foreign rm sets up an aliate in country






































304.3 Markups with trade and FDI
The basic logic underlying Proposition 4{ that foreign-owned rms will charge higher markups
than other rms{ still follows in a setting with trade in goods. There are several reasons
for this. First, in the case of production for local sale, jumping the tari barrier gives
a foreign-owned rm a cost advantage over arms-length exporters, allowing it to charge a
higher markup than if it served a destination through exporting instead of a local aliate.
In addition, the basic eciency advantage a foreign-owned rm has over domestically owned
rms in the host country shown in the case without trade still holds. Both factors lead to
higher markups for \horizontal" direct investment.
The case of FDI for export is even more interesting. A rm may invest abroad lured by
cost advantages in a country with low wages. In this case, it may begin serving its native
markets or third-country markets with much lower costs, but not much lower prices. The
degree to which the cost advantage is absorbed in the form of higher markups depends on
whether the rm was already charging the maximum markup. In markets where it already
was charging the maximum markup, it will have to pass on the entire cost advantage to
consumers. In markets where its price is set as the marginal cost of its next-best rival, then
it can absorb at least part of the new labor cost savings in the form of higher markups.
Finally, a rm may use strategic takeovers to eliminate its best foreign rivals. We dene a
strategic motive as arising from the opportunity to increase markups in any market outside
the host country, including in the parent country. Neary (2008) and Pac (2010) provide
substantial evidence that strategic motives are important to understand cross-border M&A
activity and build innovative models of this behavior in the context of a representative rm,
showing that it increases markups. The Neary (2008) model is really remarkable as the rst
mathematical framework we are aware of that predicts increases in markups from FDI, in
the spirit of Hymer (1960) as we have done here.28
Allowing for strategic takeovers is consistent with the results of our model| it need not
result in all rms charging the maximum markup| for two reasons. First, takeovers are
costly and involve technological hangups that would prevent rms from always being able
to attain the maximum markup by taking over their best rivals, either in autarky or in the
open economy. Second, the occurrence of strategic takeovers under autarky would be likely
to generate short-term increases in expected protability that would eventually encourage
additional entry, restoring the original equilibrium distribution of markups. In either autarky
or the open economy, the result is an equilibrium with dispersion in the distribution of
28With Dixit-Stiglitz preferences, entry by multinationals has no eect on markups even in the host country
and additional entry under oligopoly with identical rms would reduce markups.
31markups that is governed by the number of rivals in each industry.29
4.4 FDI, Markups and Competition: Stylized facts
Our analysis of foreign-owned rms' pricing behavior after mergers is consistent with the few
existing studies of markups and cross-border mergers and acquisitions among manufacturing
rms.30 Sembenelli and Siotis (2008) show that an increase in markups is associated with
technology transfer to the target after a cross-border merger in Spanish manufacturing in-
dustries. In the industries most intensive in research and development (R&D), \FDI has a
positive long-run eect on the mark-ups of target rms (p.108)." They argue that the key role
of R&D in predicting the behavior of pre- versus post-takeover markups implies a key role for
technology transfer between parents and subsidiaries in augmenting market power. In these
sectors, they interpret their ndings as support for \the fact that MNCs possess rm-specic
advantages that can be transferred" so that after a foreign takeover, targeted rms \enjoy
greater levels of eciency, and therefore mark-ups (p.115)." Chari, Ouimet, and Tesar (2010)
also nd that shareholders expect a bigger return when a rm in an industrialized country
takes over a rm in a developing country than when it takes over a rm in its native market{
an eect that they attribute to the transfer of managerial know-how.
The most extensive set of relevant studies analyzes foreign takeovers and markups in the
banking sector. Many, including Barajas, Steiner and Salazar (1999), Claessens, Demirg u c-
Kunt, and Huizinga (2001), Goldberg (2007), and Vera, Zambrano-Sequin, and Faust (2007),
demonstrate that the net interest margin| which de Blas and Russ (2009) show is equivalent
to the log of a markup in a BEJK framework| increases in targeted banks following foreign
takeovers, while costs tend to fall.31 Thus, existing micro evidence from both nancial and
non-nancial rms points to improvements in eciency that lead to higher markups following
foreign takeovers, the precise mechanism at work in our model.
29We show in the Appendix D that the impact of FDI on entry is somewhat ambiguous, as the prospect
of reaping a share of the prots from a foreign takeover entices entry, while the prospect of competing with
foreign-owned rms without the protection of trade costs reduces expected prots and deters entry.
30As authors since Caves (1974) have pointed out, it is dicult to disentangle the impacts of technology
transfer from changes in market competitiveness when foreign-owned rms enter a market. Authors such as
Chung (2001), Arnold and Javorcik (2005), Alfaro, Kalemli-Ozcan, and Sayek (2009) have documented the
technological transfer and spillovers that accompany foreign takeovers or inows of foreign direct investment.
31We are not aware of empirical work documenting the frequency of price adjustment by aliates of
multinational rms and thus omit further discussion of pricing. Our results would predict that in the absence
of transfer pricing, multinational aliates would be more frequent price adjusters because they are more
likely to charge the maximum markup than rms under autarky or trade.
325 Conclusions
The principal contribution of this paper is to provide well specied formulas for the distribu-
tion of markups under autarky, trade, and FDI in a Ricardian setting. To accomplish this, we
generalize the BEJK framework with endogenous markups and heterogeneous rms to allow
a role for domestic entry and foreign direct investment. In doing so, we link the theoretical
work of BEJK to numerical results in more recent papers and to a large body of empirical
work on markups and pricing in the open economy. Our formulas for the distribution of
markups demonstrate that previous numerical results are quite general and that the markup
formulas in BEJK are a special case of our generalized framework.
The distributions allow us to characterize in an analytically clean way rm markup be-
havior under trade and FDI, as well as the percentage of rms who can change their price
in response to an idiosyncratic shock in any market, or in response to a source-country-
specic shock in an export market. As in the numerical simulations of Atkeson and Burstein
(2007 and 2008) and Garetto (2009), key results include imperfect passthrough and pricing-
to-market. In addition, we can characterize an endogenous degree of pricing rigidity that
depends on market structure and varies across destination markets due to the degree of do-
mestic entry and the level of trade costs. We also show how the same mechanisms that gener-
ate pricing-to-market and imperfect passthrough allow foreign-owned rms to charge higher
markups than domestic rms. Thus, our model captures an array of previously disparate
stylized facts regarding markup behavior under trade and FDI within a modern Ricardian
framework.
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A Free entry under autarky






























= (1 + )E[M(j)
 ];
where the second equality comes from the fact that the distribution of markups is independent
of any other variable, including unit cost, and the assumption that rms take the behavior
of all rms outside their own niche j (and thus aggregate variables) as given.
37A.1 A lowerbound for the log markup.
Since the distribution of markups is the same for all goods j, we drop the goods index below
for simplicity. Taking (natural) logs, the expression decomposes into






Since the natural log is a concave function, Jensen's inequality implies E [lnM1 ]  lnE [M1 ]
and E [lnM ]  lnE [M ]. The function M  has a greater degree of convexity than






 ln(1 + ) + E[lnM
 ];
as taking the log inside the expectation reduces the right hand side more than the left hand
side. We note that for any constant k, E

lnMk
= kE [lnM], yielding
E[lnM]  ln(1 + ):
A.2 Uniqueness
Standard properties of expectations tell us that E [M(j)1 ] > E [M(j) ] for 1 >  > 1
and M(j)  1. In Proposition 1, we showed that E [M(j)] is decreasing in the number of
rivals. Thus, E [M(j)1 ] is increasing in r and E [M(j) ] is increasing even faster. Thus,
E[M(j)1 ]=E[M(j) ] is greater than 1 and decreasing in r toward 1, meaning that there
can only be one r for which the ratio equals the constant (1 + ).
A.3 Deriving the lowerbound for r
Beginning from the generalization of the Chebyshev inequality in the text, we have
r  m




 m   1

E[M(j)] m    m
:























jE [lnM ]j. Thus, switching the logs from outside to inside the expectation in equation (15) reduces the
left hand side more than the right hand side.
38B Proving that the herndahl index is decreasing in
the number of rivals
B.1 Preliminaries
1   Pr[M >  m] =
(r   1)( m   1)
1 + (r   1) m ;




 m   1
r[1 + (r   1) m]
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B.2 The Herndahl index
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=E [P(j) 2] whenever      0:5, a slightly stronger assumption than used
in Proposition 2, which was explained in detail in Section 2.3, but one that still ts BEJK's
estimates of  and .
C Markups under trade
We begin by calculating the probability that the rst- and second-best rivals are from the
same country, so that they come from a joint distribution. Let Gkni(ck) and gkni(ck) be,
respectively, the cumulative distribution and probability density of unit costs for the kth-best
rm from country i competing to supply country n.33 Then we calculate the probability
that the unit cost for the second-best rival to supply country n with some good j (we have
omitted the j index) is less than the unit cost of the best rm that could supply j to country




























































Then, we use the formula for the distribution of the ratio of two random variables, C1ni
33Explicitly,






































The probability that the second-best rival to supply a good to country n comes from
country u 6= i is equal to the probability that u has marginal cost c1 given that the best
rivals from all third countries (v 6= u;i) have a marginal cost of supplying the good to n that





























u6=i  niu = 1.
C.1 Gains from trade
To close the model under autarky or trade, we use a market clearing condition. Let D be
the share of variable costs in prots for each country, given the vector of trade costs D that
it faces when exporting. We can use the free entry condition to show that under autarky, D
equals 1
1+. Similarly, under free trade with symmetric countries, D equals 1
1+(=N). Given
our unit cost specication, the share of labor in these variable costs is . Then, the labor
market clearing condition stipulates that payments to labor equal labor's share in production
34We can ignore the second-best producer from i because the probability that both the rst and second-
best producers are from the same country, psini is independent of other countries' best draw (all countries
are drawing from independent distributions). This means we are completely ignoring the possibility of
multinational rms for the moment.
42costs:
!nLn = Dpnyn:
We use the wage as our numeraire, !  1. Then, we can compare output under autarky with











The rst term on the right-hand side is less than one and reects the fact that aggregate
revenues and average rm prots fall under trade versus autarky because opening to foreign
competiton squeezes markups. We already know from Propositions 2 and 3a that the autarkic
price level is greater than the price level under free trade. To nd out how much greater, we
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Even under symmetry, the level of gains from trade clearly depends upon the number of
domestic rivals before liberalization. In particular, they are lower for countries with a high
level of contestability (rautarky) to begin with, as these countries already have lower average
markups than their trading partners.
D FDI and entry
To examine the impact of FDI on entry, here we discuss the free entry condition in the world
with FDI and no trade. We assume for simplicity that with a cross-border takeover, the
parent rm pays a xed fraction " of its rst period output to the target rm each period
as a condition of the buyout.35 Then, the expected value of prots earned domestically,
combined with expected prots earned from overseas operations given that a rm becomes a
multinational or the expected takeover fees given that a rm sells in a cross-border takeover,
35de Blas and Russ (2010) fully endogenize the cost of the takeover{ making it equal the option value for
the target rm if it does not merge{ with no substantive change in the behavior of parents or targets. The
simpler assumption here allows greater tractibility without loss of generality. The fraction " must be large
enough that the takeover price is at least as large as the startup cost.
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From the autarkic case, we know that E[M1 ] (1+)E[M ] is monotonically decreasing
in r. But the direction of E[(M)1 ] E[(M) ] as r increases depends on several factors.
Using an approach similar to that in Appendix B, we nd that in the case of symmetry,








< m, for 1  m   m:
This means that the expected prot from overseas operations and buyout fees actually in-
creases in r unless  is suciently large relative to the size of the market and the number
of entrants. A low shape parameter, , means more dispersion in rm productivity{ thus,
greater potential for cross-border mergers to occur. Increasing the number of draws aug-
ments this comparative advantage dimension of the BEJK Ricardian framework, increasing
the possibility of a cross-border takeover and thus the expected gains from a takeover or buy-
out from the point of view of potential entrants deciding whether to draw a cost parameter.
When there is little dispersion between draws to begin with (a high ), having additional
entrants (higher r) increases the probability of an active rm benetting from a buyout or
acquisition less than it reduces the expected markup through the competitive eects seen in
the autarkic case.
The free entry condition has the same structure for the case of greeneld FDI, but in this
case the parent rm need not divide its prots with the target, with the cost that its markup
is still subject to competition from the best domestic rival in the host country, rather than
the second-best domestic rival. In countries with poor technology or high costs for domestic
36The rm does not pay the startup cost if it sells out to the foreign rm. The parent rm pays only a
startup cost in its native country. Thus, there are rm-level economies of scale from multinational production.
44entry (few domestic rivals), we would thus expect more greeneld FDI as opposed to cross-
border takeovers. In such countries, it is less likely that the eciency of the best domestic
rival in the host country would be bounding the markup of a foreign-owned aliate.
45